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FRIEND, NOT FOE: 
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
 
 
David Cortright, with Alistair Millar, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, George A. 





This paper examines the contradiction of counterterrorism measures 
(CTMs) that hinder the work of countering terror.  It is written from the 
perspective of independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek 
to advance economic development and prevent armed conflict, but whose work 
is hindered by overly restrictive counterterrorism policies.  The paper is based 
on a series of workshops and consultations conducted over the course of three 
years on behalf of the Dutch development agency Cordaid, based in The 
Hague, in cooperation with the Fourth Freedom Forum, a private research 
foundation based in Goshen, Indiana.  The paper draws from the work of 
dozens of civil society groups in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa and 
is based on interviews and meetings with hundreds of representatives of civil 
society organizations (CSOs), donor agencies, research centers, and 
governments.  It benefits especially from the work of CIVICUS based in South 
Africa and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and the Charity and 
Security Network based in Washington, D.C.  
The paper begins with a critical examination of the impact of CTMs on 
civil society development and peace building activities.  It reviews the harmful 
impact on charities of measures intended to prevent the financing of terrorism.  
The paper concludes with a critique of overly repressive and militarized 
counterterrorism strategies and identifies alternative policies based on 
comprehensive approaches that are likely to be more effective in preventing 
violent extremism and to which civil society can contribute constructively.  
I.  RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the name of fighting terrorism governments have curtailed political 
freedoms and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and 
civil society activists in many countries.  Repressive CTMs have undermined 
civil liberties and contributed to a climate of suspicion and hostility toward 
nongovernmental groups.  Many of the organizations that work against violent 
extremism by promoting human rights and sustainable development are 
themselves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to 
operate.  The positive work of civil society to alleviate social and political 
marginalization helps to reduce grievances that can lead to political violence.  
Measures taken in the name of counterterrorism that limit the political space of 
such groups have the ironic result of inhibiting work on the ground to address 
conditions that fuel terrorism. 
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In December 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights defenders reported “worrying trends” globally in the 
stigmatization of human rights defenders and their “growing categorization as 
‘terrorists,’ ‘enemies of the State’ or ‘political opponents.’”1  States 
“systematically invoke national security and public safety to restrict the scope” 
of civil society activities.2  In many countries special legislative and regulatory 
measures have been used to crack down on NGOs and activists who criticize 
government policies.  These measures make it more difficult for civil society 
actors to operate freely and effectively.  Negative impacts have been especially 
noticeable in conflict zones and among groups that challenge government 
policies through their work in peace building, democratization, and human 
rights.  CTMs, counterinsurgency operations, emergency measures, and 
repressive actions have combined, with the distinctions often blurred, to create 
hardships for those who contest unequal power relations.  
Governments have tightened controls over civil society groups by 
imposing onerous registration requirements and in some cases denying 
organizations the right to operate.  CIVICUS reported in December 2010 a 
pattern of “arbitrary denials of registration for many organizations” in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region.3  Governments have established new requirements 
for CSO reporting on finances, governance structures, and the identities of 
partner organizations and clients.4  In some countries fear-based rhetoric has 
had a chilling effect that hinders the operational freedom of nongovernmental 
groups. 
In the United States laws against “material support” for terrorism 
prohibit aiding or engaging with groups that are designated as “foreign terrorist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* This paper is the result of a collaborative research project of the Fourth Freedom Forum, 
the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and the 
Dutch development agency Cordaid. It is based on findings from four international 
conferences and interviews with dozens of representatives from civil society organizations, 
research groups, universities and government offices across the world. The principal author is 
David Cortright, Chair of the Board of the Fourth Freedom Forum and Director of Policy 
Studies at the Kroc Institute.  Cortright has written widely on ending the war in Afghanistan, 
nonviolent social change, nuclear disarmament, and the use of multilateral sanctions and 
incentives as tools of international peacemaking. He is the author or editor of 17 books, most 
recently Ending Obama's War (Paradigm, 2011) and Towards Nuclear Zero (Routledge, IISS, 
2010) and is the editor of Peace Policy, Kroc's online journal. 
1 See Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 27, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/22, (Dec. 30, 2009) (by Margaret Sekaggya). 
2 See id. ¶ 32.  
3 See MANDEEP TIWANA & NETSANET BELAY, CIVICUS, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE 
CLAMPDOWN IS REAL 6 (Dec. 2010), available at https://www.civicus.org/content/CIVICUS-
Global_trends_in_Civil_Society_ Space_ 2009-2010.pdf.  
4 See Mark Sidel, Counter-Terrorism and the Enabling Legal and Political Environment 
for Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of “War on Terror” States, 10 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT L. 7, 10 (2008). 
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organizations.”5  Under Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,6 charities could 
be convicted under the law for providing “material support” to a group that the 
government determines has diverted funds for terrorist purposes, even if the 
group in question has not been officially designated as terrorist-related and the 
charity has no knowledge of or intent to support the alleged diversion.7  Such 
an expansive definition of “material support” creates legal jeopardy for 
organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and conflict mediation 
efforts.  It places roadblocks in the way of delivering aid to designated groups 
or the communities they control.8 
In a number of countries, the creation of special security forces and 
intensified operations against insurgents and alleged criminals and terrorists 
have led to a sharp rise in the number of extrajudicial killings and abductions 
of human rights workers and political activists.  The Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative expressed concern in 2009 that human rights defenders are 
“being spied on or defamed . . . or being subject to arbitrary arrest, physical 
violence and death.”9  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted in 
September 2010 that “human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society 
activists in all regions of the world face threats to their lives and security 
because of their work.”10  
Counterterrorism measures are usually weighted toward the executive 
branch of government, with little attention to enhancing judicial independence, 
legislative oversight, and citizen involvement.  Emergency measures passed in 
the name of fighting terrorism have had the effect of undermining civil 
liberties, restricting the ability of civil society groups to operate, and impeding 
development and relief activities in marginalized communities.  Repressive 
CTMs have reversed progress achieved in recent years toward the integration 
of human rights and accountable governance into development policy.  
Individual rights and political freedoms have eroded as states have 
accumulated greater security powers.  
An overemphasis on security measures may be contributing to a 
general erosion of civil liberties and human rights.  The nongovernmental 
monitoring organization Freedom House has reported an alarming erosion of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 
18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B,” (R41333; July 19, 2010) by Charles Doyle. 
6 See 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
7 See id. at 2717. 
8 See OXFAM, WHOSE AID IS IT ANYWAY?: POLITICIZING AID IN CONFLICTS AND CRISES, 
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 145, 21 (2011), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-whose-aid-anyway-100211-en_0.pdf.  
9 COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, SILENCING THE DEFENDERS: HUMAN 
RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 18 (Maja Daruwala ed., 2009) available at 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2009/silencing_the_defende
rs_chogm_2009_report.pdf. 
10 Navanethem Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement at 
Human Rights Council 15th Sess., (Sept. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=10319&LangID=e. 
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global political freedom in recent years.  In its 2010 annual survey the 
organization noted “intensified repression against human rights defenders and 
civic activists” and reported declines for political freedom in forty countries 
representing twenty percent of the world’s total polities.11  The last few years 
have witnessed the longest continuous period of decline for global freedom in 
the organization’s nearly forty year history of publishing annual ratings.12  In 
2011, Freedom House noted a further decline in political freedom and a 
reduction in the number of countries defined as politically free.  The report 
highlighted the continued poor performance of countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa, although this trend may be partially reversed if the 
democratic revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia produce freer societies and more 
representative governments.  The Freedom House report does not link the 
erosion of liberty to counterterrorism policies.  It makes no attempt to attribute 
the observed pattern to any particular policy development, but it is at least 
plausible that the global trend toward restrictive CTMs and tighter controls on 
civil society actors may be contributing to the global decline of political 
freedom.  
II.   GENDER IMPACTS 
 Women suffer directly from counterterrorism pressures when they are 
unlawfully detained or ill-treated to gain information about a male family 
member.  They often face harassment because of their attempts to win freedom 
for those imprisoned men or gain information about the disappeared.  As noted 
by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
women are often at the forefront of efforts to resolve abductions and 
deportations of family members, and as a result they are themselves 
“susceptible to intimidation, persecution and reprisals.”13 
 Extremist groups have targeted women by restricting their public 
mobility and imposing harsh codes of behavior in the regions they control.  
Women faced restrictions on their movement and participation in public life 
during the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and still do today in some 
communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The West’s support of women’s 
rights in Afghanistan since 2001 has created a backlash against Afghan 
women’s rights defenders.  In Afghanistan, as in other countries, human rights 
defenders are often caught between militant group pressures and government 
counterterrorism measures. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Freedom in the World 2010: Global Erosion of Freedom, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-world-2010-global-erosion-freedom, (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
12 See id. 
13 See HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO 
DEVELOPMENT, REP. OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCED AND INVOLUNTARY 
DISAPPEARANCES, A/HRC/10/9, Feb. 25, 2009, ¶ 455, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/111/84/PDF/ G0911184.pdf?OpenElement.  
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 Abusive interrogation methods have a gendered dimension.  At Abu 
Ghraib and other prisons, US contractors and soldiers manipulated gender and 
cultural stereotypes as a means of coercive interrogation, including the use of 
female interrogators to torment and question naked male Arab prisoners.  In 
some countries!that are allies of the United States!where prisoners are 
rendered, officials have resorted to the threat or use of violence and sexual 
abuse against prisoners and their relatives as a means of extracting 
information.  In the United States and other countries hyper-masculine imagery 
and language may play a role in motivating overly aggressive military and 
counterterrorism actions.14 
 In some countries women who wear visible religious garb are subjected 
to discrimination and profiling.  France has banned the wearing of the hijab in 
schools, and government officials in other countries have adopted or are 
considering similar measures to restrict the wearing of religious clothing and 
symbols in public places.15  Political and social pressures against Muslim 
immigrants have increased in Europe and other regions in recent years.  So 
have misconceptions and stereotypes falsely equating the wearing of the hijab 
with terrorist sympathies.  In some instances, anti-terrorism posters have 
included images of veiled women.16  Populist politicians have exploited such 
distortions to fan the flames of intolerance and gain electoral advantages.  As a 
result, Muslim women are often stigmatized for following their religious and 
cultural traditions.  This can generate feelings of humiliation and anger among 
the affected women and their family members and may exacerbate tensions 
between social communities. 
 Women have important contributions to make in combating violent 
extremism.  In some of the world’s most dangerous settings they have proven 
to be courageous and effective advocates for peace.  Yet women often are not 
heard or adequately represented in policy-making bodies.  The denial of 
women’s voices in counterterrorism policy is contrary to the intent of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 and related measures, including Resolution 
1960 (2010), which emphasized the importance of female participation in 
conflict prevention and peacemaking.  The active involvement of women is 
essential to the crafting of effective and balanced means of countering armed 
violence.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See The United States and Gender, National Security and Counterterrorism Concept 
Note, N.Y.U. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUSTICE, April 14, 2010, 
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/ConceptNote.pdf.  
15 See BBC News, The Islamic Veil Across Europe (Sept. 22, 2011, updated June 15, 
2010), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/5414098.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
16 See Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, G.A. Res. A/61/267, U.N. Doc. A/61/267 para. 38–39 (Aug. 16, 2006), available at 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/477/03/PDF/N0647703.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Mar. 
25, 2012).   
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III.  SECURITIZING AID 
 The recent global focus on counterterrorism and multilateral 
counterinsurgency operations has accelerated a trend toward using aid and 
development funding for security-related purposes. 
  This approach subordinates traditional goals of mitigating poverty to 
the agenda of counterterrorism and defeating insurgency.  It blurs the analytic 
boundaries between security and development while politicizing both and 
detracting from efforts to improve the lives of the world’s most disadvantaged 
communities.  
 The process works in two ways: a growing proportion of aid funding is 
channeled directly through military institutions, and development programs are 
increasingly implemented in support of military operations.  The percentage of 
US aid funding allocated through the Pentagon has increased in recent years 
from 3.5% in 1998 to approximately 25% ten years later.17  Aid budgets have 
increased around the world, but two-fifths of the increase since 2002 has gone 
to just two countries—Iraq and Afghanistan.18  Major recipients of US 
development assistance are countries central to security and counterterrorism 
objectives.  In some of the countries where foreign assistance is provided, 
police forces are highly repressive and unaccountable.  Assistance provided to 
such forces in the absence of needed structural reforms may simply reinforce 
repressive tendencies and undermine civil society efforts to defend human 
rights and establish democratic oversight.19 
In October 2010, the British Department for International Development 
announced a 35% increase in development funding over a four year period, 
with a major boost in spending in countries affected by conflict, especially 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.20  Over the four year period, funding to support 
overseas development in fragile and conflict-affected states will increase from 
22% to 30%.21  British development advocates welcomed the increased 
commitment to development assistance but questioned the greater 
prioritization of security concerns.  Labor Member of Parliament (MP) Joan 
Ruddock asked how the aid budget would be able to maintain its focus on 
helping women and children and reducing poverty if a third of the budget is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See Stewart Patrick & Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making 
Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role 1, 4 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 131, 2007); 
see also Amy B. Frumin, Equipping USAID for Success: A Field Perspective, PCR Special 
project briefing, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (June 2009). 
18 See OXFAM, supra note 8, at 2, 9. 
19 See Alice Hills, Trojan Horses? USAID, Counter-terrorism and Africa's Police, 27 
THIRD WORLD Q. 629, 630 (2006). 
20 See Spending Review 2010: Press Release, UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-
Room/Press-releases/2010/ Spending-Review-2010/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
21 See id.  
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reallocated to conflict zones.22  Similarly, one aid group said, “[a]id money 
should go toward poor nations rather than countries that present a security 
threat.”23  
In a February 2011 report, Oxfam argued that aid is being politicized to 
the detriment of people with the greatest need.24  The report provides that 
“lifesaving humanitarian assistance and long-term efforts to reduce poverty are 
being damaged where aid is used primarily to pursue donors’ own narrow 
political and security objectives.”25  While huge sums are devoted to countries 
where Western nations have direct security interests, “equally poor and 
conflict-afflicted countries from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the 
Central African Republic have received far smaller shares of aid relative to 
their needs.”26  Aid provided through a security lens overlooks the plight of 
some of the world’s most marginalized populations.27  
The securitization of aid has generated deep concerns in the 
development community.28  Development advocates have sought to shield aid 
programs from military encroachments, even as they recognize the deep and 
inexorable connections that exist between development and security.29  
Accepting the need for a more integrated and coherent approach to 
development and security does not justify the “slow bleeding of financing for 
development purposes into security-related military activities,” declared a 
report for CIDSE, the coalition of Catholic development agencies in Europe 
and North America.30  Nor does it mean that all development and security 
goals are compatible.  The Association of World Council of Churches-related 
Development Organizations in Europe (APRODEV) acknowledged that 
development can contribute to security, but only if the integrity and autonomy 
of development activities are respected fully.31   
Faith-based aid agencies emphasize their commitment to the 
preferential option for the poor and the powerless, and to the vision of a more 
just and peaceful world.32  They support a holistic human security strategy that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See Nicholas Watt, Anger as Billions in Aid is Diverted to War Zones, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 19, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/19/aid-billions-
diverted-to-war-zones?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter. 
23 Ivy Mungcal, Praise and Criticism Greet UK Foreign Aid Budget Increase, DEVEX 
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.devex.com/en/blogs/the-global-development-briefing/top-story-of-
the-week-cheers-and-jeers-for-uk-foreign-aid-budget-increase. 
24 See OXFAM, supra note 8, at 1. 
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. at 18.  
28 See COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA SOLIDARITÉ, 
CIDSE STUDY ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (2006). 
29 See id.   
30 See id.   
31 See Clive Robinson, Whose Security? Integration and Integrity in EU Policies for 
Security and Development, in NEW INTERFACES BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: 
CHANGING CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 69, 81 (Stephan Klingebiel ed., 2006). 
32 See id., at 69–70. 
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prioritizes the well-being of individuals and communities rather than a narrow 
approach that protects the interests of states.33  They argue that human rights 
and development should be seen as ends in themselves, not as means to other 
purposes.34 Development cooperation should not be subsumed to an idea of 
security based on defending the interests and preserving the way of life of 
states in the global North.35  Peace cannot be imposed “from above.”36  For 
peace to be sustainable, it must grow “from below.”37 
IV.   MONEY AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM 
The development aid that is provided in Afghanistan and other war 
zones is not for the purpose of alleviating poverty and supporting long-term 
sustainability.  Its strategic objective is to gain the sympathy of local 
populations and win political support for military missions.  Aid programs 
from the US and other NATO countries generally flow to regions and 
communities where military and counterterrorism operations are taking place.  
In Afghanistan funding is concentrated in southern provinces where insurgency 
and counterinsurgency are most prevalent, while other previously less 
turbulent parts of the country receive fewer development resources. US 
military leaders are explicit in describing development assistance as an element 
of war. A US Army manual for Iraq and Afghanistan was entitled “A 
Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System.”  It described aid as “a 
nonlethal weapon”38 utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous 
population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”39  
US and allied military forces have established Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a major vehicle for providing humanitarian 
and development assistance in both Afghanistan and, previously, in Iraq.  
PRTs have been criticized by development experts as “overwhelmingly 
military in scope and operation,” with a primary focus on force protection and 
security assistance.  Problems identified with the PRTs include “generally poor 
development practice” and “relative lack of attention to promoting good 
governance and the rule of law.”40  A subcommittee of the House Armed 
Services Committee in the US Congress reported that PRTs tend to pursue 
“short-term, ‘feelgood’ projects . . .  without consideration of larger strategic 
and capacity-building implications.”41  A January 2010 report by seven !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 See id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 75. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, US ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, 
COMMANDERS’ GUIDE TO MONEY AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND 
PROCEDURES 13 (2009), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf. 
39 Id. at 1.  
40 Patrick & Brown, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
41 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY: LESSONS 
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humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan argued that PRTs often “lack the 
capacity to manage effective development initiatives.”42  In many cases, PRTs 
rely on wasteful and corrupt contractors with limited capacities and have weak 
links to local communities.43  PRTs are unable to gain the trust of local 
populations and thus cannot foster the sense of community ownership and local 
empowerment that are needed to achieve sustainable development.  Many 
Afghans are afraid to work with the PRTs for fear of insurgent attacks directed 
against these foreign-run military institutions.44  
The US military has also established the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP), which allows field commanders to dispense 
payments of tens of thousands of dollars or more on projects intended to 
generate goodwill among local populations.  CERP spending in Afghanistan 
increased sharply over the years, from $40 million in 2004 to $1 billion in 
2010.45 The program has been criticized by the US Government Accountability 
Office for a lack of management and oversight and for the absence of metrics 
for evaluating the impact of local projects.46  A report of the Committee on 
Appropriations of the US House of Representatives described CERP as a 
program with “few limits and little management.”47  
Military forces are not appropriate providers of development assistance.  
Military service members do not have the mandate and are not trained or 
equipped to address problems of “underdevelopment, alienation, and 
instability” in marginalized communities.48  “Few soldiers possess [the needed] 
expertise in matters of governance, development, and the rule of law.”49 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 72 
(2008), available at https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/SCDSM/Links/Forms/PRT_Report.  
42 ACTION AID ET AL., QUICK IMPACT, QUICK COLLAPSE: THE DANGERS OF MILITARIZED 
AID IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-2010.pdf.  
The seven organizations contributing to this report include ActionAid, Afghanaid, CARE, 
Christian Aid, Concern, Oxfam, and Trócaire. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 3.  
45 Frank Oliveri & Emily Cadei, Afghanistan: Mission Uncertain, 2010 CQ WEEKLY 
2382, available at http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-
000003752697. 
46 US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-736R, MILITARY OPERATIONS: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO BETTER GUIDE PROJECT SELECTION FOR COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
PROGRAM AND IMPROVE OVERSIGHT IN IRAQ (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08736r.pdf; US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-
615, MILITARY OPERATIONS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND INTERAGENCY 
COORDINATION FOR THE COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09615.pdf. 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 111-230, pt. 9, at 349 (2010), reprinted in 2010 USCCAN 2487, 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr230&dbname=111&.  
48 Patrick & Brown, supra note 17, at 12. 
49 See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, “The Pentagon and Global Development: 
Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 
131, November 2007, 12. 
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Assigning these tasks to military rather than civilian actors displaces the role of 
civil society and undermines the principles of local self-reliance and grassroots 
empowerment that are vital to genuine development and democratic 
governance.  
The January 2010 report by humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan 
summarized the dire consequences of militarizing aid:  
More and more assistance is being channeled through military 
actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the 
underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought 
by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined.  
Development projects implemented with military money or 
through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast 
results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate[,] and do not 
have sufficient community involvement to make them 
sustainable.  There is little evidence this approach is generating 
stability and, in some cases, military involvement in 
development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives 
further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-
government elements.50 
Direct attacks on aid workers have increased in recent years.  A 
comprehensive database maintained by US, Canadian and Irish government 
agencies shows a pattern of increased attacks on aid workers: total aid worker 
victims, including those killed, kidnapped, or injured, was 242 in 2010, 
compared to eighty-five in 2002.51  The trend reflects a greater number of aid 
workers operating in insecure areas, but also results from an apparent rise in 
politically motivated attacks, which account for nearly half the total.52  
The Director of Operations for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) warned recently that linking humanitarian action and security 
operations endangers aid agencies and diminishes their ability to serve 
populations in need.53  Subordinating humanitarian assistance to military 
purposes is a violation of the ICRC Code of Conduct, which provides for a 
strict separation of humanitarian assistance from any military or political 
agenda.54  Separation is necessary to safeguard aid workers and the 
communities they serve and to uphold the principle of prioritizing 
humanitarian assistance according to need.55  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 ACTION AID ET AL., supra note 42, at 1. 
51 Major Attacks on Aid Workers: Summary Statistics (2000–2010), THE AID WORKER 
SECURITY DATABASE, HUMANITARIAN OUTCOMES (Feb. 5, 2012), 
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/ summary. 
52 OXFAM, supra note 8, at 20. 
53 See Pierre Krähenbühl, The Militarization of Aid is Perilous, STARS AND STRIPES, Jan. 
15, 2011; The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Geneva: ICRC, 1994), available at 
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54 Id. 
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V.   TARGETING CHARITIES 
Tighter restrictions on international financial transactions are a central 
element of international counterterrorism policy.  The intended purpose is to 
prevent the financing of terrorism, but these measures have the effect of 
hindering the work of foundations, nongovernmental groups, and charitable 
agencies that support humanitarian and peacemaking activities.56  Some donors 
have become risk averse and reluctant to fund initiatives that address 
controversial issues or challenge inequalities.  The new rules have had a 
chilling effect on donors and charities, and have left vulnerable populations 
underserved.  Allegations of wrongdoing and restrictions on nonprofit 
financing have eroded trust and cooperative relations between donors and 
overseas partners in many countries.57  They have created a “cloud of 
suspicion” over the entire nonprofit sector.58 
Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties because of 
CTMs and tighter restrictions on transnational funding.  The Oxford-based 
International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) has reported that 
Muslim NGOs “in the USA and elsewhere . . . are finding it harder to raise 
funds” and fulfill their religious duty of almsgiving, the Zak!t, which is one of 
the five pillars of Islam.59  Since 2001, three of the largest Islamic 
organizations in the US—the Holy Land Foundation, Global Relief 
Foundation, and Benevolence International Foundation—have had their assets 
frozen.60  Muslim charities and trusts in the UK also have been exposed to high 
levels of scrutiny under anti-terror legislation.  The overall effect of such 
measures is a decline in giving to Islamic charities and challenges to the 
religious obligation to serve the needy.61  
The targeting of civil society financing is rooted in the Special 
Recommendations against the Financing of Terrorism issued by the Financial 
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56 Kay Guinane et al., Collateral Damage: How the War on Terror Hurts Charities, 
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(2008). 
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Status Update, (Feb. 3, 2006), available at 
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Action Task Force (FATF).62  Recommendation VIII instructs governments 
and financial institutions to “ensure that nonprofit organizations cannot be 
misused to finance terrorism.”63  In its Interpretive Note on Recommendation 
VIII, FATF claims, without supportive evidence, that nonprofit organizations 
are vulnerable to terrorist group manipulation and exploitation.64  
  Officials of foundations and charitable funding agencies contest these 
claims and refute assertions that charities are a significant source of funding 
for terrorist organizations.  Rob Buchanan, Managing Director of International 
Programs at the US Council on Foundations, stated in a March 2009 
presentation in Washington, D.C. that there is no evidence of US charitable 
funds falling into the hands of al-Qaida or other global terrorist groups.65  Of 
the 1.8 million charitable organizations in the United States, Buchanan noted, 
only a handful have been alleged to have links with terrorism financing.  To 
date, the Treasury Department has designated eight US charities for alleged 
terrorist financing, only four of these for connections to al-Qaida.66 The most 
recent Treasury designations of US charities have been for alleged support of 
Hezbollah and Tamil organizations.  No claims of US charitable support for al-
Qaida have been registered since 2004.67  
The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury Department 
has established a Risk Matrix that stigmatizes and labels as “high risk” any 
charity that “engages in work in conflict zones or in countries/regions known 
to have a concentration of terrorist activity.”68 USAID has established a 
requirement dating from 2002 that all grantees obtain a worldwide Anti-
Terrorism Certification, dissociating themselves from dealings with any entity 
designated by the US government as terrorist-related.69  Prohibitions on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Financial Action Task Force, FATF IX Special Recommendations, 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf.  
63 Id., at 20.  
64 Financial Action Task Force, Interpretive Note to Special Recommendation VIII, 
available at http://www.fatf gafi.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530.pdf. 
65 See Charity and Security Network and Cordaid, “Friend not Foe: How the Work of 
Charities Counters Terror,” Transcript of Panel Dicussion, March 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/ system/files/Complete_March_panel_transcript.pdf. 
66 See Daniel L. Glaser, Statement to the House, Committee on Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.  Anti-Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist 
Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities, Hearing, May 26, 2010 (Serial 111-141), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-111hhrg58051/html/CHRG-
111hhrg58051.htm, accessed April 4, 2012. 
67 US DEP’T OF TREASURY, US DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY: PROTECTING 
CHARITABLE GIVING, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/Treasury%20Charity%20FAQs%206-4-2010%20FINAL.pdf.  
68 US Dep’t of Treasury, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, RISK MATRIX FOR THE 
CHARITABLE SECTOR 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/policy/charity_risk_ matrix.pdf.  
69 See USAID, World Wide Anti-Terrorism Certification (June 23, 2004), available at 
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engaging with armed actors have led to reduced support for track two 
diplomacy and informal peace processes in conflict zones.70  
In the United States, laws against “material support” for terrorism 
prohibit aiding or engaging with groups that are designated as “foreign terrorist 
organizations.”71  Under the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project ruling of 
2010,72 charities risk prosecution if they provide “material support” to a group 
that the government determines has diverted funds for terrorist purposes, even 
if the group in question has not been officially designated as terrorist-related 
and the charity has no knowledge of or intent to support the alleged 
diversion.73  Material support can be defined to include any form of 
engagement with designated individuals or entities designated as “terrorist” or 
“terrorist-supporting.”  Such an expansive definition of “material support” 
creates legal jeopardy for organizations involved in humanitarian assistance 
and conflict mediation efforts.  It outlaws engaging with armed actors to 
facilitate conflict resolution.  It places roadblocks in the way of delivering aid 
to designated groups or the communities they control.74  
In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and 
implemented regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on 
foreign funding.  In Bangladesh, the government notified NGOs that at least 
half of all foreign grants must be spent on visible development projects such as 
roads and canals.  In Jordan, government approval is needed to receive foreign 
funds.75  In some countries local groups are required to raise “counterpart 
funds” to match a percentage of the funding offered from external sources, a 
condition that is difficult to meet in low-income countries.  Hardest hit by such 
restrictions are communities in war-torn areas that depend upon the support of 
charitable agencies and funding from Diasporas and external donors.76  
VI.   COOPTION OR PARTNERSHIP?  
The US government has attempted to enlist foundations and charities in 
its war on terror.  The Treasury Department’s Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Guidelines calls upon charities to collect information about their grantees, to 
investigate possible links with terrorism, and to report “suspicious 
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information” to the Treasury Department or the FBI.77  Foundation executives 
are highly critical of such provisions and have described them as “useless and 
embarrassing, damaging trust . . . with the very groups that could make a 
difference” in addressing conditions that lead to terrorism.78  Requiring 
nonprofit groups to collect personal information on their partners puts them at 
risk of being perceived as law enforcement or intelligence agents.  It attempts 
to turn philanthropists into spies.   
A coalition of more than seventy US nonprofit agencies, led by the 
Council on Foundations, attempted for more than seven years to persuade 
Treasury officials to change the guidelines, without success.  In November 
2010, the coalition called off the talks and criticized the government for its 
“unwillingness to make any substantive changes to its approach—or to 
recognize the important role of global philanthropy in increasing national 
security through funding to address poverty, inequality, disease, and other 
pressing needs.”  The coalition has called for the withdrawal of the Guidelines 
and their replacement by the “Principles of International Charity” adopted 
voluntarily by the nonprofit sector in 2005 as an alternative means of assuring 
accountability.79    
Charitable agencies have also sharply criticized USAID’s proposed 
Partner Vetting System (PVS), which would require all USAID grant 
applicants to submit detailed personal information on key individuals within 
partner organizations.  The information could be shared with intelligence 
agencies in the event of a “risk to national security,” which is not defined.  If 
implemented PVS would impose new data collection obligations on charities 
and divert staff and funding from grant making.  It would compromise the 
independence of nonprofits operating in conflict zones and further endanger 
aid workers and their local partners.  A major health care NGO warned that the 
new procedures “can only serve to incite animus and increase the likelihood of 
attacks” against donor agencies and their partners.80  As of this writing the 
PVS proposal has not yet been implemented, but USAID is proceeding with 
preparations for its introduction.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 US DEP’T OF TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST 
PRACTICES FOR US-BASED CHARITIES, (2006), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-
issues/protecting/docs/guidelines_charities.pdf. 
78 Teresa Odendahl, Comments at the Panel Discussion: Safeguarding Charity in the War 
on Terror, Georgetown University, Center for Public & Nonprofit Leadership, (June 14, 2005), 
available at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Charity061405.pdf; GUINANE ET AL., supra 
note 53, at 44. 
79 Treasury Guidelines Working Group of Charitable Sector Organizations and Advisors, 
Principles of International Charity (2005), available at 
http://www.usig.org/PDFs/Principles_Final.pdf.  
80 Letter from the Global Health Council to Philip M. Heneghan of USAID, (Aug. 23, 
2007), available at http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/5914_PVS_GHC_letter.pdf; GUINANE 
ET AL., supra note 42 at 58. 
252 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 2012 
 252  
 While many States follow the US model of establishing onerous vetting 
and registration requirements on charities, some governments take a more 
cooperative approach to addressing the risks of terrorist financing.  The 
European Commission has issued guidelines and a draft code of conduct for 
engaging with civil society groups.81  The EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Council seeks to safeguard the integrity of the nonprofit sector and assure 
greater dialogue among States, civil society groups, and relevant stakeholders.  
Accountability and transparency are “at the heart of donor confidence,” 
according to the Justice and Home Affairs Council.  The challenge of 
preventing terrorist finance requires “effective, proportionate measures of 
oversight,” which are best achieved through cooperation rather than 
accusation.82 
 The recent World Bank study on nonprofit organizations questioned 
whether government regulation is the best way of preventing the diversion of 
charitable funding to terrorist purposes. It noted the existence of self-regulatory 
mechanisms within the nonprofit sector that have the force of contract and can 
impose penalties on organizations that violate the law and agreed codes of 
conduct.  Because they cannot succeed without public trust, nonprofit agencies 
are subject to peer pressure and have strong incentives to eliminate fraud and 
abuse within their sector.  The World Bank study urges governments to 
“recognize the need felt in the sector to demonstrate its good governance . . . 
and use that aspiration to also address terrorism financing concerns,” allowing 
nonprofits to take ownership of the problem through greater transparency.83 
VII.  HOW (NOT) TO PREVENT TERRORISM 
Restrictions on civil society organizations and charities are rooted in a 
“war on terror” approach to preventing violent extremism. Since 2001, the 
United States has relied primarily on militarized policies in its attempts to 
suppress al Qaida and prevent future terrorist attacks. The Obama 
administration has discontinued war-on-terror rhetoric and banned the use of 
torture, but U.S. policies remain heavily militarized, and have become more so 
with recent troop increases in Afghanistan and the increasing use of drone 
strikes and cross border special forces operations in Pakistan. In the global 
fight against terrorism, the United States continues to rely on policies of 
targeted killing, lawless apprehension, rendition, warrantless surveillance, and 
indefinite detention. The language is changed but the means are the same; a 
war on terror by another name. 
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 An over-reliance on military force is an inappropriate and ineffective 
strategy for countering terrorism. A 2008 RAND Corporation study, How 
Terrorist Groups End, shows that terrorist groups usually end through political 
processes and effective law enforcement, not the use of military force. An 
examination of 268 terrorist organizations that ended during a period of nearly 
forty years found that the primary factors accounting for their demise were 
participation in political processes (43 percent) and effective policing (40 
percent). Military force accounted for the end of terrorist groups in only 7 
percent of the cases examined. Terrorist groups end most often when they trade 
bombs for ballots and join a political process, or when they are suppressed by 
local law enforcement agencies. Policing works best when law enforcement 
officials are rooted in local communities, and have the confidence and trust of 
local residents that enables them to penetrate criminal networks.84 
  War policies are not only inappropriate, they are counterproductive. 
When Western nations invade and occupy Muslim countries, this has the 
unintended effect of validating the ideology of extremists who claim to be 
saving Islam from foreign infidels. Polls in Muslim countries have shown 80 
percent agreement with the view that Western military interventions are 
directed against Islamic society; that they are at war against Islam itself.85 As 
long as these attitudes prevail there will be no end of recruits willing to blow 
themselves up to kill foreign troops and their supporters. 
Most governments and international officials have emphasized the 
necessity of cooperative law enforcement to counter transnational terrorism. 
Especially effective are programs that emphasize community policing and 
respect for the rule of law and the rights of citizens. International police 
cooperation and intelligence sharing have been successful in thwarting attacks, 
perhaps most dramatically in foiling an alleged plot to bomb flights from 
London to the United States in August 2006.86 The head of the Crown 
Prosecution Service in the United Kingdom said, “The fight against terrorism 
on the streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the 
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enforcement of our laws and the winning of justice for those damaged by their 
infringement.”87 
VIII.  A HOLISTIC STRATEGY AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
Security protections are necessary but not sufficient to the strategy of 
preventing violent extremism and countering global terrorist threats.88  A 
comprehensive approach is needed that balances security with the rule of law 
and the defense of human rights.  In his March 2005 report, In Larger 
Freedom, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need for a 
holistic strategy: “[D]evelopment, security, and human rights go hand in hand. 
. . . we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security 
without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human 
rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”89  
In 2006 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy that embodies Annan’s call for a more 
comprehensive and integrated approach.  The Strategy transcends the narrow 
security-oriented focus of earlier Security Council resolutions and links the 
struggle against terrorism to a broader set of principles for avoiding violent 
conflict through development, democracy, and diplomacy.  The Strategy 
identifies four pillars of international policy:   
I. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism;90 
II. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism;91 
III. Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and 
to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard;92 and 
IV. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law 
as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.93 
It is significant that the first of the pillars focuses on conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism.  This places the primary emphasis on 
efforts to advance development and good governance, not on security 
measures.  The Strategy defines “conditions conducive” as “prolonged 
unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, 
national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic 
marginalization, and lack of good governance.”94  The way to fight terrorism, 
according to the Strategy, is not only to enhance security, through such 
measures as improving border controls, but to adopt preventive measures such 
as resolving conflict, ending foreign occupation, overcoming oppression, 
eradicating poverty, and promoting sustainable economic development and 
good governance.95  The Strategy notes that success in realizing development 
objectives and improving human rights and governance, “could reduce 
marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels 
extremism and the recruitment of terrorists.”96 
The UN Strategy is important because it helps to shift the focus of 
international policy away from a narrow focus on security toward a more 
comprehensive approach that prioritizes development, human rights, and 
democratic governance.  Because it is approved by all UN member states, the 
Strategy has enormous political legitimacy.  It gives prominence to conflict 
prevention rather than security protection.  Pillar I pays specific attention to the 
advancement of development, while Pillar IV emphasizes the promotion of 
human rights and the rule of law.  The protection of human rights cuts across 
all four pillars of the Strategy with the instruction “that States must ensure that 
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under 
international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international 
humanitarian law.”97  The Strategy provides opportunities for promoting these 
goals through the cooperation of states and the support of multiple 
stakeholders, including specific mention of civil society as having an important 
role to play when implementing the strategy. 
Civil society groups play an indispensable role in advancing human 
rights.  Repressive governments by their very nature lack effective mechanisms 
for considering these issues.  They are loath to consider policy changes that 
can lead to more representative governance and greater economic and political 
equity.  These are precisely the areas where CSOs can be most helpful.  
Development and human rights groups can prevent violent extremism by 
pursuing their core mission of rights-based development.  The nonprofit sector 
of a country is a force for good, according to the World Bank study; it should 
be “protected, rather than unnecessarily curtailed.”98 
Through their efforts for development, conflict transformation, and 
human rights, civil society groups are working to dry up the wells of 
extremism from which violence springs.  Civic organizations address political 
grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power imbalances that are among 
the roots causes of armed conflict.  This work is not labeled counterterrorism, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism.  
International policymakers must recognize and protect this vital civil society 
mission and take action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs. In the global 
struggle against terrorism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends, 
not hounded as foes. 
 
 
 
